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the functional connections among its products. Thus, perception and
action should not be studied in isolation; most likely perceiving-
acting is not a decomposable system.
The main assumption of the target article is a logical corollary
of this broader claim and, as such, we agree with it. However, the
Theory of Event Coding (TEC) does not fulfill its promise, and it
makes the very mistake it is meant to correct.
We will focus on the authors’ brief, dismissive comments about
the motor theory of speech perception. The authors provide two
reasons for their dismissal. First, they do not wish to claim that
their account applies to language. Second, in the opinions of
Jusczyk (1986) and Levelt (1989), empirical support for the mo-
tor theory is weak. We address what the authors prefer not to be-
cause we consider the reasons for their dismissal mistaken.
However, we will not reply to the second reason here. Evidence
from half a century of research cannot be summarized as tersely
as a dismissal can be offered (for a review, see Liberman 1996). As
for the first reason, speech is an exquisite example of perceptually
guided action, and thus it must be addressed by a theory of per-
ception-action codings. Moreover, precisely because it cannot be
reduced to the stimulus/response experimental settings the au-
thors choose to use, it is the right place to look for a better un-
derstanding of the couplings between perception and action. And
the empirical facts that led to the motor theory reveal the flaws of
TEC to which we have alluded.
In the tasks that support TEC, experimenters devise stimuli
that can be described by sets of arbitrarily-chosen, arbitrarily-
combined features (e.g., a letter is red or green; a rectangle is on
the right or left side of a computer screen). In the tasks, some of
the features are relevant, and so the participants are encouraged
to make use of them to do the task, and they do. However, these
sets are not up to the task of constituting percepts or action plans
in nature. Proponents of TEC have to answer, among others, the
following questions:
1) Can such feature sets compose real perception-action cod-
ings?
2) Are percepts linear combinations of features?
3) If they are to refer to the distal world, perception-action cod-
ings must be grounded. How are features grounded?
The motor theory of speech perception was designed to answer
these questions, which arose when Alvin Liberman and colleagues
sought the features that capture our perceptions of syllables (Li-
berman 1957; Liberman et al. 1967; Liberman & Mattingly 1989).
They started where Hommel and colleagues would have liked
them to start. During the fifties, as a part of a project to build a
reading machine for the blind, they tried several ways to teach
people to perceive syllables as strings of featurally distinct sounds.
They devised “acoustic alphabets”: acoustic features corresponded
to single letters, and syllables were sequences of discrete acoustic
letters. After years of effort, the project failed. Speech is not an
acoustic alphabet, and people could not perceive acoustic alpha-
betic sequences at practically useful rates.
This realization provides an answer to our first question: arbi-
trarily-chosen, arbitrarily-combined features do not correspond to
perception-action codings.
The next move of Liberman and colleagues was also aligned
with TEC. Perhaps the sounds created by the vocal tract have a
special character for which arbitrary sounds cannot substitute. Us-
ing the sound spectrograph, Liberman and colleagues searched
for acoustic features that, they hoped, would characterize sylla-
bles. Again, their hopes were frustrated. Spectrograms, far from
clarifying the picture, presented a new puzzle. Depending on the
context, the same acoustic feature could specify different pho-
nemes and, conversely, different acoustic features could specify
the same phoneme. Acoustic features do not capture the dimen-
sions of the space where syllables live.
We can now answer our second question: percepts are not nec-
essarily linear combinations of acoustic features. But, more im-
portantly, this second failure taught Liberman and colleagues a
lesson. Once they rejected features as components of speech per-
cepts, they recognized that there is an invariant among different
tokens of the same phoneme; it is in the gestures that produced
them. This discovery led to a major revision of their scientific as-
sumptions. Motor competence, not the feature set conceived by
the scientist, underlies speech perception. The motor theory was
born, and it provided a surprising answer to our third question:
speech perception is not grounded in the realm of perception, but
in the very place where, according to the common coding of dis-
tal events, it should be grounded: in the actions of the vocal tract!
To understand the nature of perception-action codings, a major
revision of the conceptual apparatus used to implement TEC is
needed, beginning with careful decisions about what should and
should not count as an observable. Liberman, and with him Roger
Sperry (1952), suggested that the use of two different sets of ob-
servables – one for perception and one for action – is misleading;
motoric observables capture cognition. Although we do not en-
tirely accept this full motorization of cognition, the hard learned
lessons that led to the motor theory tell us that the observables
conceived by a theory of disembodied cognition will not work.
Here lies the major limitation of TEC. It rejects the unreasonable
division between action and perception at the level of distal
events, while claiming that “late action” and “early perception” are
not necessary to explain cognitive common coding. If not there,
among the nuts and bolts of the contact between the nervous sys-
tem and the physical world, where are we to find the grounding of
perception-action distal identity?
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Abstract: Natural language processing involves a tight coupling between
action (the production of language) and perception (the comprehension
of language). We argue that similar theoretical principles apply to language
processing as to action/perception in general. Language production is not
driven solely by the speaker’s intentions; language comprehension is not
only input-driven; production and perception use common representa-
tions. We will relate recent findings from our language production lab to
the Theory of Event Coding (TEC)’s principle of feature binding.
Hommel et al. consider standard approaches studying action and
perception in isolation to be flawed. They argue that action does
not start solely from an organism’s goals and intentions, nor is per-
ception input-driven only. The authors present what they refer to
as a set of “metatheoretical principles” (TEC) in which action and
perception are mutually dependant processes, sharing a common
representational medium (event codes). In this commentary, we
will argue that these metatheoretical principles can be and should
be extended to the field of natural language processing (psy-
cholinguistics), a field of study that the authors explicitly exclude
from their target article (see sect. 2.1.4.1). However, in our opin-
ion, language should not necessarily fall outside the scope of their
theory, for two reasons. First, language processing in natural dia-
logue consists of a cycle of tightly coupled events, that consecu-
tively involve action (producing an utterance) and perception
(perceiving the interlocutor’s utterance). These events are closely
related. However, like older research traditions in action or per-
ception, research in language has mainly considered production
and comprehension as isolated events, ignoring this tight cou-
pling. Second, Hommel et al. argue for a common representa-
tional medium for action and perception. We argue that the same
is true for linguistic acting and perceiving.
1. The fundamental concern of psycholinguistics should be
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dialogue, not monologue. Current research on language process-
ing tends to view production and comprehension as isolated events.
Views on language production can perhaps best be characterized
by the subtitle of Levelt’s (1989) influential book, Speaking from
intention to articulation, which clearly reveals the essential ideo-
motor view that presently dominates production research. Like-
wise, research on language comprehension mostly studies the
reading of isolated words or sentences. This line of research at-
tempts to exclude responses (perhaps most successfully in ERP
studies on sentence comprehension, where the lack of the need
for a response is regarded as a virtue) or to ignore them (e.g., by
tacitly assuming that word naming latencies reflect only percep-
tual aspects of reading; see Bock 1996). However, such research
does not do justice to the fact that language is usually produced in
dialogue, where perception/production interactions are of central
importance (Pickering & Garrod, submitted). Consider a ques-
tion-answer pair. It is not only the goals and intentions of the an-
swer-giver that drive the content and form of the utterance: it is
also the content and form of the question that is being asked.
There are also perhaps less obvious phenomena in dialogue that
suggest a tight coupling between production and perception. Al-
most any statement calls for a particular type of response from the
interlocutor; dialogue partners often co-produce utterances (you
start a sentence and I finish it); dialogue partners tend to “align”
their representations (i.e., they tend to use the same linguistic
units at each level of processing); they monitor and correct not
only their own speech but also that of the other. Any theory of lan-
guage use needs to account for this coupling between production
and comprehension processes.
2. Common representations for production and perception. A
fundamental assumption of TEC is that action and perception
make use of common codes. Similarly, there is growing consensus
in psycholinguistics that common representations are used in lan-
guage production and language comprehension, although theo-
rists are still arguing whether this is only true for abstract lexical
representations (Levelt et al. 1999), or for most linguistic levels
(MacKay 1987; Pickering & Garrod, submitted). One piece of ev-
idence for this parity of representations is the finding of syntactic
priming from comprehension to production (Branigan et al.
2000). Producing a particular syntactic form (e.g., a passive)
increases the likelihood of that form being produced again on a
subsequent trial (Bock 1986). However, Branigan et al. showed
that perceiving a particular sentence type is sufficient to create a
priming effect in production, suggesting a common code for per-
ceptual and production codes for syntax. According to Pickering
and Garrod, common representations play a crucial role in dia-
logue, because they allow a pair of speakers to achieve “alignment”
(similar representations at each level). This alignment is their
main theoretical construct for explaining the fluency of dialogue.
3. Effects of feature overlap in language processing. One ex-
ample of the possible viability of TEC as an explanatory mecha-
nism for linguistic processes comes from the domain of syntactic
priming. There is now a large body of evidence from our group
that this effect is modulated by the degree of lexical overlap (e.g.,
Pickering & Branigan 1998): the more words are shared between
prime and target, the more syntactic repetition. Why is this? From
a TEC perspective, one could consider a sentence an integrated
representation binding syntactic information and lexical informa-
tion. If a particular structure, say a prepositional object dative, is
bound to particular words (e.g., the nun showing an apple to a pi-
rate) and if a subsequent picture shows one or more of these ele-
ments (say, the nun giving an apple to a priest), then it would be
relatively costly to say the nun handing the priest the apple be-
cause it would require undoing the binding between particular
words and a particular phrasal configuration. The more words are
shared, the costlier the undoing of these bindings would become.
4. Conclusion. Current-day psycholinguistics is still too much
focussed on sentence-production and comprehension in isolated
contexts (monologue) and tends to ignore action/perception in-
teractions, except in some circumstances such as self-monitoring
of speech (Hartsuiker & Kolk 2001; Levelt 1989) or in some ap-
proaches that stress the role for production in comprehension
(Garrett 2000). We think that psycholinguistics would benefit
from the controlled study of language in dialogue, casting findings
in theoretical frameworks such as TEC.
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Abstract: The Theory of Event Coding (TEC) is a significant contribution
to the study of purposeful perceptual behavior, and can be made more so
by recognizing a major context (the work of Tolman, Liberman, Neisser);
some significant problems (tightening predictions and defining distal stim-
uli); and an extremely important area of potential application (ongoing an-
ticipation and perceptual inquiry, as in reading and movies).
Hommel et al.’s paper on the Theory of Event Coding (TEC) is
a significant contribution toward a science of purposeful percep-
tion and action, one in which the course of intended actions, like
key-pressing, is determined by component action codes that share
a common cognitive representation with stimulus feature codes
(“red,” “round,” etc.). Supporting research mainly concerns inter-
actions between stimulus and response features as associatively
formed during instructed repetitive practice.The authors stress
that the stimuli that most directly determine the event are not
proximal but distal, by which they mean the perceived features in
represented space. This, they rightly contrast with the common
approach in which stimuli and reponses are defined in terms of
the physically measurable proximal stimulus input and effector
output. (This particular use of the word “distal” may prove mo-
mentarily confusing to perception psychologists, since it is not a
2D projection vs. 3D layout that is at issue.)
Their approach is not quite as uncommon or isolated as their
presentation suggests. Tolman’s historic analyses (1932; 1948) of
animals’ purposive behaviors in, and memories of, their behavioral
environments in response to the patterns that offer a “means-end
readiness” (since termed an “affordance” by Gibson 1979; see
also Lewin’s valence-driven events in life space), were instantiated
by specific experimental demonstrations, like place learning, in
which behavior was far better predicted by measurable variables
in distal space than by proximal stimulus measures. This approach
was not abandoned, nor is it rare. Research on place learning and
its purpose-relevant stimuli is not obsolete (cf. Gallistel 1990), and
research into the brain processes of topological learning is cutting
edge (cf. Zinyuk et al. 2000). Indeed, closely related “construc-
tivist” approaches in which behavior is explained in terms of
events that transpire in an internalized space abound today, al-
though not in connection with Reaction Time (RT) experiments,
and with little work until now on the explicit relationship between
the goal, the stimulus information, and the action.
What is uncommon about TEC is that it appears to set the stage
for systematic co-analyses of such purposive behavior, in which the
signal and the action are closely related and commensurate. There
are, however, several serious problems to be resolved and oppor-
tunities grasped, before we can be as comfortable as we might be
with TEC as a framework. Namely, in ascending order of diffi-
culty:
(1) More explicit modeling is needed than has been reported
in the target article, in order to reach conclusions that are more
definite than the ones the paper typically offers, for example, that
such-and-such an outcome is not incompatible with TEC.
(2) Identifying and codifying of feature codes is needed if they
are to be applied by more than intuition. The “distal stimulus”
needs principled, circumstance-dependent definitions: the au-
thors obviously do not mean measures defined only in terms of the
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